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Problems with Relocations: Is the Fifth Amendment a 
Possible Solution? 
 
Kendra R. Howard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Environmental justice” theory asserts that minority and low-
income communities bear a disproportionate number of 
environmental burdens and undesirable land uses.1 Recent studies 
show that minorities suffer excessively from exposure to 
environmental risks caused by pesticides, hazardous wastes, water 
pollutants, and airborne pollutants.2 Minorities’ lack of political and 
economic power, or even outright racial bias, affecting both siting 
and permitting decisions may cause this disproportionate burden.3 In 
1994 President Clinton signed an Executive Order entitled “Federal 
Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations” 
 
 * J.D. candidate, 2001, Washington University School of Law. 
 1. Karen Smith, How the Legal System Has Failed the Environmental Justice Movement, 
12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 325 (1997). 
 2. Id. at 327-30. 
 3. Id. at 331-32. Some politically powerless communities with high unemployment rates 
welcome locally undesirable land use sites (LULUs) because of their potential to provide 
employment or other economic incentives: 
A recent example of community support for a LULU designation occurred in the 
predominately African-American town of Convent, Louisiana. Residents of Convent 
complained that the environmental justice advocates opposing the approval of a 
proposed plastics plant never bothered to ask residents if they wanted the plant in their 
community. Most residents welcomed the plant because of the hundreds of jobs and 
millions of dollars in school revenue that could be generated by its designation. In 
situations like the one in Convent, environmental justice advocates surmise poor and 
minority residents’ support for LULUs because of limited economic opportunities 
available in their communities. Concerned that communities like Convent may be 
vulnerable to the promise of economic prosperity made by facility owners seeking a 
home for their undesirable land use, the federal government becomes an active 
participant in the environmental justice movement.  
See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 834 (1995). A siting decision is selecting where a 
LULU will be located. A permitting decision is selecting a license or permit  to allow the LULU 
to operate. 
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in an effort to promote environmental justice.4 The Executive Order 
stated that federal agencies should determine which of their activities 
adversely affect minority and low-income populations and make an 
effort to address these concerns.5 The Executive Order strongly 
encouraged the consideration of demographic impacts in 
environmental decisions. However, it made clear that there is no 
legally enforceable right to equitable distribution of environmental 
risks, at least not under the Executive Order.6 Part I of this Note 
discusses the problems associated with relocating neighborhoods and 
explores the possibility of applying the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to cases involving problems with relocations. Part II of 
this Note examines the background of relocations including the 
actions of the EPA, communities, and industry to correct the 
problems involved in relocations. Part III analyzes the idea that the 
Takings Clause presents a distributive justice issue applicable in an 
environmental justice context. Part IV examines the Takings Clause 
and its possible application to correcting problems with relocations. 
Part V proposes that the Takings Clause should apply to relocation 
situations. Finally, Part VI concludes that problems exist with 
applying the Takings Clause to relocations involving private entities. 
II. BACKGROUND ON RELOCATIONS 
Communities relocate as a result of solid and hazardous waste 
disposal, mining wastes, underground mine fires, application of waste 
oils on dirt roads, military dumps, and industrial plant discharges.7 
 
 4. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in  42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1995). 
 5. Id.  § 1-101. The Executive order stated that “each Federal agency shall make 
achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as 
appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its 
programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations.” Id. 
 6. Id. § 6-609. Equitable distribution refers to ameliorating the disproportionate burden 
on low-income populations and minority populations when making decisions regarding 
LULUs. 
 7. The terms “relocation” and “buyout” are used interchangeably. A community is 
relocated in two situations. The first situation is where the community rallies for and desires 
relocation because of pollution. The other situation is where an expanding company desires the 
community’s land and forces the community to move, or a company squeezes out members of a 
community by buying only a few of the abandoned homes. This Note will address the first 
situation in which communities want a permanent move. 
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No one agency, level of government, or set of rules dictates the 
direction of relocation. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
federal government, state governments, local governments, and 
industries blamed for the contamination all provide funds to relocate 
communities. 
A. EPA Actions 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)8 in 1980. CERCLA 
authorizes the EPA to respond to threatened and actual releases of 
hazardous substances.9 In 1982 the EPA promulgated the National 
Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)10 
pursuant to CERCLA and Executive Order 12316.11 The NCP sets 
forth regulations to implement CERCLA provisions.12 The Superfund 
 
 8. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). CERCLA, commonly known as the Superfund, 
was enacted by Congress on December 11, 1980. This law created a tax on the chemical and 
petroleum industries and provided broad federal authority to respond directly to real or 
threatened releases of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the 
environment. Over five years, $1.6 billion was collected and the tax went to a trust fund for 
cleaning up abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. CERCLA established 
prohibitions and requirements for closed and abandoned hazardous waste sites, § 9621, 
provided liability for persons responsible for the release of hazardous waste at these sites, 
§ 9607, and established a trust fund to provide for clean up when no responsible party was 
identified, § 9611. 
 9. National Superfund Permanent Relocation Interim Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,012 (July 
8, 1999). 
 10. 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1982). The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan, more commonly called the National Contingency Plan or NCP, is the federal 
government's blueprint for responding to both oil spills and hazardous substance releases. The 
National Contingency Plan is a national response capability and promotes overall coordination 
among the hierarchy of responders and contingency plans.  
 11. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (Aug. 20, 1981). The Executive Order states: 
1(a) The NCP, which was originally published pursuant to § 311 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, shall be amended to contain the implementing procedures for 
the coordination of response actions to releases of hazardous substances into the 
environment. 1(c) The responsibility for the amendment of the NCP and all of the 
other functions vested in the President by § 105 of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liabilit y Act of 1980, is delegated to the Administrator 
of the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Id. 
 12. Id. 
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Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) amended CERCLA 
in 1986.13 CERCLA outlines two types of response actions: removal 
actions, used when immediate action is required;14 and remedial 
actions, used in longer-term, non-time critical events.15 CERCLA 
authorizes temporary relocations in both remedial and removal 
actions,16 while it considers permanent relocations only in remedial 
actions.17 The two primary rationales behind selecting relocation as a 
remedy are health considerations and engineering considerations.18  
The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property 
Acquisition Policies Act (URA) sets out regulations for use by all 
federal agencies when implementing relocations.19 The Department 
of Transportation developed and oversees the URA20 to ensure fair 
and equitable treatment in cases of relocation. 21 The URA covers 
property acquisition procedures and relocation benefits, and it 
requires that the residents receive the fair market value of their 
property at the time of the acquisition.22 The Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation perform the relocations for 
the EPA.23 Of the many problems and concerns involved in 
relocations, balancing health concerns with the huge costs involved in 
relocations remains the primary concern.24  
 
 13. Id. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) amended CERCLA 
on October 17, 1986. SARA reflected the EPA's experience in administering the complex 
Superfund program during its first six years and made several important changes and additions 
to the program.  
 14. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9610(23) (1994).  
 15. § 9601(24). 
 16. § 9601(23).  
 17. § 9601(24).  
 18. Health considerations are risks that could not be addressed in a timely manner without 
relocation. Engineering considerations include the fact that a proper clean-up of a site may 
require the demolition of homes. 
 19. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MEETING SUMMARIES FROM THE EPA/ICMA RELOCATION 
STAKEHOLDER FORUMS 1, 3 (May 1998). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 3. 
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1. Escambia Pilot Project 
In order to understand the issues involved in relocating a 
community, the EPA selected the Escambia Wood Treating Plant in 
Pensacola, Florida as a national relocation pilot project.25 The plant 
began operation in 1942 as a manufacturing facility for the treatment 
of wood products with creosote. In 1963 PCP-treated No. 6 diesel 
fuel replaced creosote.26 The plant produced considerable amounts of 
contaminated wastewater, which it sent to an unlined impoundment 
on the site. After the plant had operated for thirty-eight years, the 
EPA requested that the plant file a notice of its hazardous waste 
activity and issue a report on its processes.27 In 1985 the plant 
received a warning letter from the EPA because of its violation of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act financial requirements.28 
After the plant failed to respond to the warning letter, the EPA sent a 
Notice of Violation.29 Over the next four years, the plant committed 
more violations and the EPA and the Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection took enforcement actions and, finally, in 
1991 Escambia declared bankruptcy and left the site.30 An 
Environmental Response Team assessed the site and found that a 
removal action was necessary. In October of 1991 the EPA began 
removal action and placed the site on the National Priorities List.31 
Throughout the clean-up and relocation process, contentions grew 
between the EPA and the community surrounding the site.32 The line 
of communication between the EPA and the community remained 
closed.33 The EPA continually shifted its position regarding the 
 
 25. National Superfund Permanent Relocation Interim Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. at 37,012. 
 26. ENVTL. P ROT. AGENCY , supra note 19, at 26. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. Sites are listed on the National Priorities List (NPL) upon completion of a Hazard 
Ranking System (HRS) screening, and public solicitation of comments about the proposed site. 
Final placement of the site on the NPL occurs after all comments have been addressed. Issues in 
this process include how sites are placed on the NPL, the public comment process, and how 
sites are deleted from the NPL. The NPL primarily serves as an information and management 
tool. It is a part of the Superfund clean-up process and is updated periodically. 
 32. ENVTL. P ROT. AGENCY , supra note 19, at 26. 
 33. Id. 
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relocation, initially contending that relocation was unnecessary, and 
then deciding to implement a full relocation. 34 This shift in policy 
eroded the trust of the community.  
2. Stakeholder’s Forums 
The EPA learned from the Escambia pilot project experience and 
noted the problems in the community’s attitude toward the EPA. As a 
result, the EPA decided to hold a series of forums with 
representatives from those affected by relocations.35 Participants 
represented industry, local government, state government, 
environmental organizations, public health organizations, federal 
agencies, and environmental justice groups.36  
In July, 1999 the EPA used the feedback generated by the forums 
to establish an Interim Policy on Relocations. Although this policy 
addresses many key issues, there are critical issues that still need 
resolving. 
3. Interim Policy on Relocations 
The Interim Policy on the Use of Permanent Relocations as Part of 
Superfund Remedial Actions (the Policy) provides guidance to EPA 
regional decision makers on when to consider permanent relocations 
as part of a Superfund remedial action. 37 The EPA prefers to address 
contamination by utilizing clean-up methods that allow people to 
remain in their homes.38  
However, the Policy lists examples of the types of situations 
where the EPA may consider permanent relocation. The list includes 
situations where the contamination cannot be cleaned up because of 
structures on the property, structures that cannot be decontaminated 
to safe levels, and treatment options that would require unreasonable 
restrictions on community members–like not allowing children to 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. National Superfund Permanent Relocation Interim Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. at 37,013. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 37,012. 
 38. Id. at 37,013. 
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play in their yards.39 Furthermore, the Policy stresses the importance 
of working with the affected stakeholders to identify major issues that 
need consideration in the remedy selection evaluation. 40 
The Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation conduct relocations for the EPA because of their 
expertise in applying the URA.41 The EPA also provides relocation 
counseling services as required under the URA.42 When potentially 
responsible parties fund relocations, they should follow procedures 
comparable to the URA.43 As soon as the EPA becomes involved at a 
site, it should involve community members.44 Communities wishing 
to use a relocation expert or advisor can access one through the 
EPA’s Technical Assistance Grant Program.45 The EPA also 
recommends formation of a community group to discuss the issues 
involved with relocating.46 The Policy also suggests that the EPA 
should explore opportunities to partner with other agencies and 
organizations such as the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development or the Red Cross to help identify other potential 
assistance.47 
B. Community and Industry Actions 
Many communities find strength in community organizing. A 
solid, unified community group provides a good bargaining position 
to demand results.48 
 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. National Superfund Permanent Relocation Interim Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. at 37,014. 
These groups developed expertise in applying the URA because many government agencies 
utilized them to handle numerous property acquisitions. 
 42. Id. Available services include moving costs, utility deposits, interest differentials, 
transportation costs, school costs, and cemetery relocation costs. CTR. FOR HEALTH, ENV’T AND 
JUSTICE, GETTING ORGANIZED AND GETTING OUT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO CONTAMINATION, 
COMPENSATION AND RELOCATION (1994). 
 43. National Superfund Permanent Relocation Interim Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. at 37,014. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. CTR. FOR HEALTH,  ENV’T AND JUSTICE , supra note 42. The Center for Health, 
Environment and Justice identified steps to successfully form a strong and organized 
community group. Step one is to identify who lives and works in the community. It is important 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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From the industry’s prospective, a proactive buyout is the most 
economical option. 49 A company that is forced to participate in a 
buyout may incur expense as a result of litigation costs and damage 
to their reputation in the community.50 Companies also believe that, 
 
to find out whether everyone wants relocation or if some want to stay regardless of the risks. 
Step one also considers churches and businesses that depend on the community for financial 
support, and then decides where to draw the lines of the evacuation.  
 The second step entails identifying the problem by noting where the strange smells 
originate, and the symptoms of those who suffer from illness as a result of the toxins.  
 Step three outlines building people power. The group must educate the community about 
the problem through print media or television. Door-to-door contact is extremely effective in 
gaining a person’s complete attention and addressing any concerns they have immediately. 
Petitions also effectively rally support, especially when combined with door-to-door activities.  
 Step four is a community meeting. Select ing both a good location and date prove key when 
organizing a large community meeting. The meeting must have an agenda that covers pertinent 
issues and gives the meeting substance and direction.  
 Step five is setting goals. Goal setting should include the entire group and goals should 
never be set solely by a core group of leaders. 
 Step six is setting up the organization. The authors suggest a wheel and spoke design for 
setting up the organization. At the center of the wheel lies the hub, or community group, and the 
spokes of the wheel represent standing committees. Each committee has a chair that guides the 
committee in meetings and courses of action. Each committee then presents its ideas to the hub. 
This is the best way of organizing because the spokes offer diverse groups for each person to 
join so they are not forced to agree on one specific approach. 
 Step seven focuses on relocating the community. This step includes identifying all issues 
associated with relocating, like moving costs and what to do with the land when people choose 
to stay in the community. Vacant homes attract vandals, making security an issue for those who 
remain. The community should also make arrangements for the maintenance of vacant areas to 
prevent overgrown grass or litter.  
 Step eight is identifying targets. Once the community knows the origin of the problem, they 
must decide how to implement change. They may choose legal, scientific, or political strategies 
or a combination of the three. However, the plan of action the commun ity chooses is useless if 
the public is not made aware. Id. 
 49. Telephone Interview with John Mitchell, Vice President of Consulting Service, 
Prudential Interaction Consulting (Nov. 17, 1999) (on file with author). 
 50. Id. A company is in a better situation in a proactive buyout because it may negotiate a 
more satisfactory deal. If the company is forced to buyout a community, a court may force it to 
pay more money to move the community. Also, the community will probably look upon the 
company disfavorably because of its reluctance to voluntarily settle the matter. The company 
would then incur costs to control the damage done to its name because of the negative 
perception of its unwillingness to voluntarily participate in a buyout.  
 A Louisiana district judge upheld a water permit for a plastics company planning to build a 
$700 million plant in a minority, low-income neighborhood, but stated that the company must 
compensate nearby residents for any drop in property value. William Pack, Shintech Gets 
Permit, May Have To Pay Compensation, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La), Jan. 24, 1998, at 
1B. The oral ruling confused the parties to the dispute. The judge did not state how to determine 
the amount for compensation, nor how far one could live away from the plant and still receive 
compensation. Id. The company needed the water permit and other air permits from the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/12
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rather than spending millions to fight local residents, they may avoid 
lawsuits and gain favorable publicity by relocating the residents.51 
However, companies typically do not want to establish a precedent of 
relocating communities that complain about living near plants. They 
fear that the prospect of relocating may encourage people to move 
near plants and then blame the plants for illnesses they may have 
already had.  
C. Case Study—Wagner’s Point 
Wagner’s Point in Baltimore, Maryland, illustrates how the 
community, government, and industry can effectuate a relocation. 
After forty years of living in what they called an “industrial ghetto,” 
the 249 residents of Wagner’s Point in Baltimore, Maryland wanted 
out.52 Community residents felt that they were forced to endure 
horrible living conditions that wealthy neighborhoods would never 
experience.53 Every day community residents inhaled noxious odors 
from the sewer plant and oil refinery located in their backyards.54 The 
warning sirens from the twenty-plus chemical plants near their homes 
terrified the community residents, and they suffered as loved ones 
died of cancer.55 This neighborhood of twelve-square blocks 
 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality to begin construction of the plant. Id. 
Residents tried to stop issuance of the permit stating environmental justice as the basis their 
argument. Id. The judge ruled that although many of the community’s residents were black, the 
site selection was race-neutral. Id. The judge also stated that the permitting process failed to 
adequately consider the impact the plant would have on the value of the surrounding property. 
Id.  
 51. Joe Mathews, Paying Neighbors to Move; Mossville, BALT. SUN, Dec. 6, 1998, at 1A. 
Some companies fear that buyouts will get out of hand with the prospect that people will be 
encouraged to move near a plant. Id.  
 Five elements provide successful relocations conducted by private industry: (1) the base 
offer is established by appraisal; (2) a premium over the appraisal price; (3) allowances 
(miscellaneous expenses like driver’s licenses and other special moving expenses); (4) a bonus 
(not in all programs) to sign up early, accept the offer, or to clear the lot; and (5) an information 
center staffed with people with real estate skills to help find new housing for residents (the 
sponsor maintains these centers rather than the attorneys because the sponsor must maintain a 
relationship with the people even after the attorneys leave). Id. 
 52. Heather Dewar & Joe Mathews, Residents Want Out of Industrial Ghetto , BALT. SUN, 
Apr. 19, 1998, at 1A. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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experienced an abnormally high cancer rate, particularly lung cancer, 
lymphoma, and leukemia.56  
A test of the neighborhood’s air showed three cancer-causing 
chemicals at levels up to thirty times higher than levels the EPA 
considers safe.57 Wagner’s Point’s cancer rate scored above the 
citywide average, which was higher than the state’s average. 
Moreover, the state’s average ranked the highest in the nation.58 
Despite this evidence, the industries refused to offer financial support 
for the buyout59 and adamantly denied causing the residents’ health 
problems.60  
Because there was only one road leading into the neighborhood, in 
the event of an emergency, plans called for residents to shut 
themselves in their homes.61 Consequently, community residents 
lived in constant fear of chemical accidents because the city had no 
plan by which to evacuate the residents.62 
The residents wanted the city, state, and the responsible industries 
to help move them out of the neighborhood in order to attain a better 
quality of life.63 The noxious industrial factories significantly lowered 
the property values in the neighborhood, so residents could only 
afford decent housing elsewhere if they received well above market 
value for their homes.64 The residents argued that it would cost the 
government more to provide services and health care to the people in 
the neighborhood than it would to relocate them.65 The residents 
gained the support of the Center for Health, Environment and Justice, 
an organization that helps communities fight the pollution in their 
neighborhoods.66 They also had the University of Maryland 
 
 56. Joe Mathews, Hopkins Professor Prepared to Proceed with Cancer Research in 
Wagner’s Point; Study Needs Government Funding , BALT. SUN, June 5, 1998, at 3B. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Joe Mathews, City Denies Wagner’s Point Request; Schmoke Refuses Plan to 
Relocate Residents Out of Industrial Area, BALT. SUN, June 20, 1998 at 1A. 
 63. See Dewar & Matthews, supra note 52. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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Environmental Law Clinic as their counsel. 67 In addition, the 
residents had the support of many politicians.68  
The residents approached the city, state, and various industries 
proposing that the three entities combine to pay $15.2 million to 
relocate the residents of Wagner’s Point.69 Each of the ninety-eight 
homeowners would receive $115,000 and the twenty-six renters 
would receive $30,000 each.70 The proposal also requested payment 
of moving expenses.71 The city responded that as a matter of law and 
public policy they could not pay residents more than the market value 
of their homes.72 According to city records, the highest property 
value in Wagner’s Point between 1993 and 1997 was $30,000.73 The 
city rejected the proposal, explaining that the mayor’s office received 
calls from people in Wagner’s Point who did not want to move.74 In 
addition to six families that expressed reluctance to relocate, two 
family-owned businesses did not want to move away from the 
petrochemical companies they served.75  
The mayor soon changed his mind and decided to purchase the 
homes in the neighborhood, but under different terms than the 
residents’ proposal.76 The mayor offered to buy the land under the 
city’s eminent domain laws for future expansion of a city sewage 
treatment plant.77 The mayor stated that the city would pay only 
market value and that any additional payment money must come 
from other sources.78 Otherwise, the city would not participate in a 
buyout.79  
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Joe Mathews, Wagner’s Point Awaits Reply From Mayor on Proposal, BALT. SUN, 
June 16, 1998, at 3B.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Joe Mathews, City Denies Wagner’s Point Request, BALT. SUN, June 20, 1998, at 1A. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Joe Mathews, Wagner’s Point Residents Protest, BALT. SUN, July 2, 1998, at 1B.  
 75. Joe Mathews, Wagner’s Point Buyout Plan is Revived, BALT. SUN, July 8, 1998, at 1A 
[hereinafter Mathews, Buyout]; Joe Mathews, Wagner’s Point Bill Introduced , BALT. SUN, Oct. 
20, 1998, at 1B. 
 76. Mathews, Buyout, supra  note 75. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Joe Mathews and Gerard Shields, Wagner’s Point Thrown A Curve, BALT. SUN, July 
17, 1998, at 1A. 
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The decision met with mixed emotions. The plant’s expansion 
required all the residents to leave their homes.80 However, the 
residents wanted to move somewhere to obtain a better quality of life, 
and not just move for the sake of moving. 81 The residents feared that 
industry and government no longer would have an incentive to help 
them once the city condemned the property. 82 The residents sent 
letters to companies such as Shell Oil, Condea Vista, FMC 
Corporation, and Chevron requesting money to buy homes of similar 
condition and size in a neighborhood without heavy industry. 83 The 
U.S. Senate approved a spending bill that included $750,000 for the 
buyout.84 The money came from a federal Department of Housing 
and Urban Development grant to Maryland’s Department of Housing 
and Community Development85 and required residents to apply for 
the money from the state.86  
On October 13, 1998 an explosion occurred at the Condea Vista 
chemical plant located in the neighborhood. 87 The residents panicked 
because there were no emergency procedures in place.88 The 
company contended that the blast emitted nothing dangerous into the 
environment.89 However, many residents complained of eye and 
throat irritation after the accident, and three people went to the 
hospital. 90 The attorneys from the University of Maryland 
Environmental Law Clinic advised the government that the 
community needed emergency planning reform,91 but no one 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. One woman stated, “I would rather see my kids get cancer when they’re 50 than 
have us move into the project s . . . and take a chance of them getting shot.” Id. 
 82. Joe Mathews, Wagner’s Point Negotiations End Abruptly, BALT. SUN, Sept. 18, 1998, 
at 12B. 
 83. Joe Mathews, Money Sought From Chemical Companies, BALT. SUN, Oct. 8, 1998, at 
3B. 
 84. Joe Mathews, Senate OKs Bill to Give $750,000 for Buyout, BALT. SUN, Oct. 9, 1998, 
at 4C.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Joe Mathews, UM Analysis Faults Officials After Oct. Blast, BALT. SUN, Nov. 21, 
1998, at 2B. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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addressed the issue.92  
In November of 1998, Condea Vista decided to contribute to the 
relocation.93 This relocation by government and industry set a 
national precedent.94 The state promised up to $2 million to help 
residents find comparable homes elsewhere.95 This allowed the 
residents to locate more expensive housing than their current 
Wagner’s Point homes. Later, Condea Vista, a detergent ingredient 
producer, and FMC Corporation, a herbicide maker, decided to offer 
$5,000 as settlement to everyone who lived in Wagner’s Point the 
previous year.96 However, the $5,000 per person was taxable and was 
attached to the residents’ release of the companies’ liability. 97 By 
signing the release, the residents relinquished any future right to sue 
the companies even if they later could prove that the companies 
contributed to their illnesses. Residents criticized the offer as an 
attempt by the companies to put a price on the loss of loved ones who 
died as a result of these very companies’ negligence.98  
FMC and Condea Vista hired Prudential Community Interaction 
Consulting to administer the relocation program.99 The chemical 
industry’s decision to act stemmed from a combination of sympathy 
for the residents; weariness from a year of news coverage; and fear of 
the residents’ attorney, Peter Angelos, the Orioles owner and one of 
the state’s foremost plaintiffs’ lawyers.100 Most of the residents, 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Joe Mathews, Chemical Plant to Help Move Neighborhood, BALT.  SUN, Nov. 26, 
1998, at 1B. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Joe Mathews, Companies, Community Discuss Offer, BALT. SUN, June 15, 1999, at 
3B. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Joe Mathews, Chemical Companies Make Offer, BALT. SUN, June 9, 1999, at 1B. 
Angelos agreed to work pro bono. The residents long had stated their desires to compromise 
and not to involve legal action; however, the residents were frustrated by the lack of 
cooperation by the plants. After the city, state, and federal government agreed to help, the 
residents began to think about suing the plants. Angelos was willing to help them make a deal; 
however, that would be difficult because there was little or no evidence of a connection 
between the illnesses and the industrial pollution. Joe Mathews, Angelos Takes Up Wagner’s 
Point Cause; Residents Want Influence as They Consider Lawsuits, BALT. SUN, Mar. 18, 1999, 
at 3B.  
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excited about moving to their new homes, found the process slowed 
by the confusion and the inability of the state and federal officials, 
who were providing discount loans and other assistance, to work with 
the city.101 The exact terms of the takeover remained uncertain for the 
residents.102 Many of them had made offers on other homes, but they 
did not know for certain how much they needed to spend or when 
they could move.103  
In the end, each resident received approximately $25,000 plus the 
market value of their homes in their devalued state. Emotions ran 
high as the residents left their homes.104 Many had lived there all of 
their lives.105 A wave of nostalgia hit as the community held a going-
away party.106 Although the community members did not negotiate 
their relocation terms, most were grateful that the time finally arrived 
when they could move away from the heavily industrialized zone.107  
D. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
Money is the main problem for people who want to relocate. 
Usually, the residents of these communities are too poor to move 
without first selling their property. However, pollution often has 
rendered their property unmarketable. The people in Wagner’s Point 
were moved because the city applied its local eminent domain law to 
acquire the property.108 A possible solution to the problem of 
financing the relocations of neighborhoods lies in the application of 
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause,109 or its state counterpart, in a 
 
 101. Joe Mathews, Barely Looking Back at Old Wagner’s Point, BALT. SUN, July 20, 1999, 
at 1B.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Matthews, supra note 101. 
 107. Id.  
 108. “Eminent Domain is a sovereign power like that of the power to tax, or the police 
power. Not only the Federal and State governments enjoy this power but also subdivisions of 
government like towns, villages, school districts, and counties. Most public utilities also have 
this power delegated to them by the U.S. Congress or by State legislatures.” Sydney Z. Searles, 
The Law of Eminent Domain, in  SB48 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, EMINENT 
DOMAIN AND LAND VALUATION LITIGATION 1, 6 (1997).  
 109. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads, 
in part: “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. 
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different manner from that used in Wagner’s Point.110 The 
community members would receive relocation funding from the 
government if they could demonstrate that the government took their 
land for public use by contaminating the land itself or by permitting 
companies to contaminate the land. Thus, the taking would require 
the government to pay just compensation to the community. 111  
III. ANALYSIS: TAKINGS CLAUSE AS APPLIED TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE 
The property rights of persons with historically vulnerable 
interests require more protection. 112 The Takings Clause reflects the 
Framers’ belief that the rights of private property were especially 
vulnerable to failures of the political process.113 The Takings Clause 
should protect those “who have been singled out and to discrete and 
insular minorities.”114 Underrepresentation of minorities in legislative 
bodies115 and a lack of political or economic power help explain this 
failure. Courts initially interpreted the Takings Clause to defer to 
decision makers in most instances, but also to defend the most likely 
victims of political process failure.116 Studies conducted to determine 
 
CONST. amend. V. 
 110. The Takings Clause ensures that the government does not confiscate the property of 
some and give it to others. It also spreads individual loss to society if that individual’s loss 
benefits society. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood , 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 957 (1982); Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH . & LEE L. 
REV. 1097 (1981). The Supreme Court explained that a principal purpose of the Takings Clause 
is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 111. The Supreme Court expansively defined “public use” so that virtually any taking will 
meet the requirement. The Supreme Court indicated that a taking is for public use if it meets a 
rational basis tests. It is for public use so long as the government acts on a reasonable belief that 
the taking will benefit the public. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 
(1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). 
 112. Sandra L. Geiger, Note, An Alternative Legal Tool for Pursuing Environmental 
Justice: The Takings Clause,  31 COLUM. L. REV. 201 (1995).  
 113. Treanor, supra note 3, at 834. 
 114. Id. at 856. 
 115. Danial A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on 
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 685, 705-06 
(1991). 
 116. See Treanor, supra note 3. 
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whether minorities moved into the areas of locally undesirable land 
use sites (LULUs) because the land was cheaper, or if companies 
chose the sites because the land rested in a minority neighborhood117 
indicated that original siting decisions placed the sites in  minority 
communities.118 
Courts have not expressed a concern for protecting these victims 
of political process failure who have remained a concern of the 
Constitution since its framing. 119 Courts instead take the approach set 
forth in Armstrong v. United States.120 Chief Justice Rehnquist,121 
Justice Scalia,122 and Justice Stevens123 applied this approach, which 
dictates that courts should read the Takings Clause “to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”124 When courts apply this approach, they fairly balance 
public need against private harm in situations where minority 
property rights would most likely be treated unfairly.125  
The environmental justice movement seeks to eliminate 
disproportionate adverse effects on both minority and low-income 
populations.126 Advocates of this movement usually seek race-
conscious judicial remedies, such as Section 1983 and the Equal 
Protection Clause, to prevent the placement of LULUs in poor and 
minority communities.127 Thus far, these remedies have failed.128 
Some scholars suggest moving away from using civil rights and 
environmental law statutes as a solution, and instead using the 
 
 117. See id. at 875. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. at 877. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1994); Pennell v. San Jose, 485 
U.S. 1, 9 (1988); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
318-19 (1987). 
 122. See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 19 (Scalia, J. dissenting); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 
483 U.S. 825, 835-36 & n.4 (1987). 
 123. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071-76 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 608 (1987). 
 124. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Geiger, supra  note 112, at 203. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
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Takings Clause as a solution for residents living near LULUs who 
seek compensation. 129 Such a compensation scheme could create a 
buffer zone around the LULU, creating a viable alternative for 
residents unable to enjoin the location of a LULU in their community 
and who cannot financially afford to relocate.130  
Civil rights statutes and environmental laws fail to provide a 
solution131 as the problem of environmental racism perseveres.132 The 
Takings Clause may help only in a limited number of cases.133 A 
challenge to a LULU is more likely to succeed as a state claim than 
as a federal claim because many state provisions encompass a 
broader range of property interests. In addition, a claim is more likely 
to prevail if the case is argued as a physical taking of property rather 
than a regulatory taking.134 
Many reported cases involve landowners seeking compensation 
for an alleged taking of their property because a LULU was placed in 
their neighborhoods by local county boards or commissions.135 
 
 129. See id. at 204. 
 130. Id.  
Just compensation is a method of allowing affected residents to “vote with their feet” 
if their opposition against the siting of a LULU does not succeed. Id. “Voting with 
Feet,” also known as the Tiebout Model, is a model that shows the role of consumer 
choice in the development of the fragmented systems of local government. The idea is 
that people vote with their feet, choosing the local government that provides the best 
combination of taxes and local public goods. If they are dissatisfied with their current 
municipality, they move to another one.  
Id. at 204 n.18 (citing Arthur O’Sullivan, Voting with Ballots and Feet, URB. ECON., 520-21 
(1993)). 
 131. See Geiger, supra  note 112, at 208-24. 
 132. See id. at 225-26. 
 133. See id. at 231-45. 
 134. Id. at 245-46. 
 135. See East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n. v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning 
Comm., 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Smith v. City of Brenham, 865 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 
1989); Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 20 Cal.3d 285 (Cal. 1977); Aiello v. Browning-Ferris, 
Inc., 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 20771 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Langley Land Co. v. Monroe County, 738 F. 
Supp. 1571 (Ga. 1990). 
In most cases, either states have established a committee to oversee the issuance of 
permits to hazardous facilities or have left such siting decisions to the local county 
boards. For example, in California, the Permitting and Enforcement Committee of the 
State Waste Management Board oversees the approval of landfill permits. In addition, 
each local county board of supervisors is responsible for the approval of commercial 
toxic waste incinerators for their cities. Therefore, it is not surprising that an increasing 
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However, only a few reported cases reached the takings issue.136 In 
Smith v. City of Brenham, the property owners alleged a taking by the 
siting of a proposed city landfill near their property. 137 The court held 
that the takings argument was weak because the government decision 
did not encompass their property. The decision only involved nearby 
property.138 In addition, the court stated that fluctuations in value are 
incidents of property ownership. 139 
In the similar case of Mongrue v. Monsanto, the property owners 
claimed that waste water from Monsanto Company’s injection wells 
damaged their subsurface property.140 The court stated that Monsanto 
“cannot be liable for a taking under Louisiana law because it is not a 
private entity authorized by Louisiana law to expropriate private 
property for a public and necessary purpose.”141 
In Smith, the court easily answered the question of government 
action because the landfill was city-owned. However, in the case of 
private industry LULUs such as in Mongrue, state action may not 
exist. Therefore, in situations where the government is directly 
involved in a siting decision and the siting actually encompasses the 
owner’s property, the Takings Clause may apply. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE TO RELOCATION 
SITUATIONS 
A. Physical Acquisition by Government Required 
The Takings Clause requires that the government physically take 
private property. The Supreme Court noted in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter CATV that a physical occupation authorized by the 
government is a taking regardless of whether the government, or a 
 
number of environmental groups have accused local and state government agencies of 
environmental racism. Generally, these agencies are the defendants in complaints filed 
on behalf of the affected landowners residing near the designated sites. 
Geiger, supra note 112, at 208. 
 136. Smith v. City of Brenham, 865 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 663. 
 139. Id. 
 140. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16663 at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 1999). 
 141. Id.  
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party authorized by the government, is the occupant.142 Advocates 
may argue that pollution of the land constitutes a physical taking.143 
Contamination of the air, soil, or water can render the land 
uninhabitable.144 A compensable taking occurs if the pollution 
directly interferes with or disturbs owners’ property rights.145 The 
residents’ health and the diminution of their property disturbs their 
property rights.146 The “stigma” of environmental contamination 
detrimentally affects on the property and its value.147  
The Supreme Court case of Causby v. United States bolsters this 
theory of physical invasion by environmental contamination. 148 The 
Causby Court held that continuous invasions of airspace super-
adjacent to the property that directly and immediately interfere with 
the enjoyment and use of the property constitutes a taking within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.149 
Moreover, when industries emit toxins that contaminate the soil, air, 
and water, the emissions constitute permanent invasions.150  
The Tenth Circuit criticized this theory of physical invasion in 
Batten v. United States.151 In Batten, property owners living next to 
an air base complained of strong vibrations, loud noise, and smoke.152 
The court held that the military operations did not constitute a 
compensable taking. The court stated that the plaintiffs did not claim 
that the military operations rendered their homes uninhabitable; thus, 
 
 142. 458 U.S. 419, 432 n.9 (1982). See also  Store Safe Redlands Ass’n v. United States, 35 
Fed. C. 726, 728 (1996). 
 143. See supra note 109. 
 144. See Geiger, supra note at 112, at 236. 
 145. See Richmond Elks Hall Ass’n v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 561 F.2d 1327, 
1330 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 146. Geiger, supra note 112, at 236. 
 147. See, e.g., Finkelstein v. Dep’t of Transp., 656 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1995) (“ ‘Stigma’ 
may be defined as the reduction in value caused by contamination resulting from the increased 
risk associated with the contaminated property.’ In sum, many prospective buyers are afraid of 
the financial risk associated with contaminated or even previously contaminated properties and 
would therefore pay less for the property.”) (citing MELVIN A. RESKIN & PATRICK J. ROHAN 
NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14C.06 [1], at 14C-52-53 (1994)). 
 148. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
 149. Id. at 266. 
 150. Id. 
 151. 306 F.2d 580. 
 152. Id. at 581-83. 
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the disturbances were merely interference.153 Federal courts 
traditionally recognize that property owners need more than mere 
consequential damages to require compensation. 154 Property owners 
receive compensation for damages to property not taken only as a 
consequence of or incidental to an actual taking. 155 The court also 
denied recovery because no regular flights ran over the property and 
thus the military operations could not constitute a physical 
invasion.156  
Applying the rationales used in Causby and Batten, contamination 
of the soil and water by chemical plants constitutes a taking because 
environmental contamination regularly occurs and consequently 
renders the homes uninhabitable. However, the main question 
remains: What is the government’s participation? 157 In Causby and 
Batten, the government participation was clear because the 
complaints stemmed from military operations. Does this reasoning 
apply in situations where the government merely authorizes and 
licenses a private entity to operate and pollute nearby property?  
The best-known case confronting licensing as state action is 
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis. In Moose Lodge, a club restricted 
membership to whites and refused to allow guests to bring blacks into 
the dining room and bar.158 A member’s guest argued that by granting 
a liquor license, the club’s act of discrimination became the state’s 
act. However, the Court stated that in order to establish state action, 
there must be “significant involvement” by the state.159 The Court 
 
 153. Id. at 585. 
 154. Id. at 583. 
 155. Because of this rule, many state constitutions provide that private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without compensation. Id. 
 156. Id. at 584. 
 157. The state action doctrine states that the Constitution’s protection of individual liberties 
apply only to the government, not to private entities. Except for the Thirteenth Amendment, 
none of the Constitution’s provisions are directed at private actors. See Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 511-16 (1985).  
 There are two exceptions to the state action doctrine. One says that a private entity must 
comply with the Constitution if it is performing a task that has been traditionally and 
exclusively done by the Government. The other says that private conduct must comply with the 
Constitution if the Government has authorized, encouraged, or facilitated the unconstitutional 
conduct. 
 158. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
 159. Id. at 173. 
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held that issuing a license did not constitute significant involvement 
by the state.160 Therefore, the application of the Takings Clause to 
private industry action may not be possible without more direct 
government involvement than licensing, such as government 
authorization, encouragement, or facilitation of an act that would not 
otherwise occur without government intervention. 161 
B. Just Compensation Required 
The owner of taken land should receive just compensation. No set 
formula limits just compensation.162 The initial inquiry, however, 
focuses on the fair market value of the property on the date of the 
taking,163 which represents the price that a willing seller reasonably 
would demand and a willing buyer reasonably would pay for the 
property.164 Courts find that the value of property depends on its 
present condition and use and its reasonable use in the future.165 
Thus, compensation for residents roughly equals an amount 
comparable to what the property would be worth had it not been 
contaminated, or what the property would be worth if it were in 
another area. Therefore, residents would receive enough 
compensation for their homes to allow them to find comparable 
housing elsewhere. 
 
 160. Id. The Court emphasized that the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board played no role 
in establishing or enforcing the membership or guest policies of the Lodge. Id. The Court 
concluded that “there is nothing approaching the symbiotic relationship between lessor and 
lessee that was present in Burton.” Id. at 175. 
 161. Professor Charles Black called that state action doctrine “a conceptual disaster area: 
because the Court has made a series of inconsistent rulings in determining what constitutes state 
action. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreward: State Action, Equal Protection, and California’s 
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 75 (1967). 
 162. The Supreme Court has ruled that just compensation is measured in terms of the loss 
to the owner; the gain to the taker is irrelevant. Boston Chamber of Com. v. Boston, 217 U.S. 
189, 195 (1910) (stating that the measure is “what has the owner lost, not what the taker has 
gained.”). 
 163. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). “Just compensation” 
must provide a party a full and perfect equivalent in money. Id. 
 164. United States v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 165. Board of County Comm’rs v. Nobel, 184 P.2d 142, 143 (Colo. 1947). 
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V. PROPOSAL: THE TAKINGS CLAUSE SHOULD APPLY TO 
RELOCATIONS 
Courts generally construe a “taking” in a very narrow context. 
However, courts should view a taking in a broader context to 
encompass property owners whose property rights are interfered with 
by neighboring LULUs. If a homeowner cannot enjoy his property 
rights because of noxious odors coming from a nearby plant, a taking 
has occurred.  
Relocation situations in which there is a substantial connection 
between the contamination and the government may fulfill the public 
use requirement. Thus, the Takings Clause can solve many of the 
cases that involve government participation, but the cases that 
involve private entities remain problematic. However, no clear-cut 
answer exists as to how much government participation is needed to 
apply the Takings Clause.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Relocation is a long, hard fight for a community. A community 
must appeal to the government and industry for help with funding. 
This proves a challenging task considering that the government and 
industries have their own interests to consider. The difficulty comes 
in balancing the health concerns of community members, who are 
breathing carcinogens and watching their children play in 
contaminated soil, with the huge costs of relocating an entire 
community. The Takings Clause may offer a solution in situations 
with significant governmental involvement. Forcing the government 
to purchase the land may not impose a strain on the government 
because of the government’s option to sell the land to developers or 
other industries after contamination clean up. However, this theory of 
the Takings Clause may be considered a tenuous argument for 
establishing public use. Even if the argument for public use is 
accepted, imposing financial responsibility on the government in 
situations where the government merely issues a permit to a private 
industry responsible for the contamination remains a difficult issue to 
resolve.  
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